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The 1970s are often portrayed as the beginning of a new era of finance capitalism. The growth 
and internationalisation of banks’ balance sheets, together with the return of banking crises, 
were important changes of the decade, and for the global evolution of capitalism. How did 
banking regulation and supervision react to this evolving environment? The literature places 
considerable emphasis on the role of the United States and, to a lesser extent, of the United 
Kingdom and Japan, in the emergence of global standards in banking regulation and 
supervision, and neglects the EEC influence. Based on the archives of central banks, 
international organisations and of one bankers’ association, this article explores the 
relationships between the European and the global discussions in the development of 
international banking regulation and supervision. The article focuses on two case studies: the 
use of consolidation as a supervisory technique, which was the object of a Council directive in 
1983; and EEC observation ratios, which were an early initiative of the EEC in the field of 
bank capital harmonisation. In both cases, parallel and connected discussions occurred in the 
European and global specialised committees, the Groupe de Contact and the Banking Advisory 
Committee on the EEC side, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the global 
level. The article examines the contacts between these committees and their reciprocal 
influence in their work, thereby shedding light on the connections between European 
integration and globalisation. It contends that the EEC played a more important role in the first 
steps of international banking regulation and supervision than commonly considered in the 
literature. The article further argues that European integration served as a globalisation 
laboratory in the field of banking regulation and supervision. Accordingly, the EEC used 





The regulation of the financial sector typically illustrates the close links between the 
process of European integration and globalisation. In the 1970s and 1980s, this sector 
experienced both a deep mutation and an increased number of failures and crises. A new era 
started with the chaos resulting from the end of the Bretton Woods system and the oil shock of 
1973. These upheavals triggered regulatory reactions both at the domestic level and in the 
international arena, in order to cope with the rise of international banking and its associated 
risks. Banking supervision, that is the daily control of individual banks' activities to ensure the 
protection of depositors and the soundness of banking organisations, grew everywhere. 
However, international regulatory discussions had already started at the EEC level in the 1960s, 
without much connection with financial crises, but instead with a hope to coordinate and ideally 
harmonise the banking legislations of member countries.1 International convergence and 
financial crisis prevention have thus been two important characteristics of banking regulation 
since the 1970s. However, these two features were not specific to the EEC. Other major players 
included the United States, Japan, and an increasing number of other countries that hosted 
significant financial activity, such as offshore centres, all linked in an increasingly 
interdependent system.2 The financial sector had a prominent place in the transformation of 
capitalism in the 1970s. However, these changes were not limited to Europe, even less to the 
EEC. How the EEC responded to global economic forces and how its agenda combined global 
and EEC concerns are the object of the following lines. 
                                                          
1Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Banking Union in Historical Perspective: The Initiative of the European 
Commission in the 1960s–1970s,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (2016): 913-27. 
2Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “The Rise of International Financial Centres after the Breakdown of Bretton Woods: 
The Case of Bahrain, 1966-1986.” Monde(s) 13 (2018): 49-66 ; Olivier Feiertag and Alexis Drach, “Le Sens de 
la Mondialisation : Surveillance Bancaire et Globalisation Financière du XXe au XXIe Siècle.” Monde(s) 13 
(2018): 133-154. 
In the 1970s, international discussions on banking supervision mainly developed in two 
forums. The first one was the “Groupe de Contact”, established in 1972 at the EEC level, and 
the second one was the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), formed in late 1974 
at the G10 level.3 Another EEC group had been created in 1969 by the Commission to discuss 
the coordination of banking legislations in the Community. This group was focused on banking 
legislation more than supervision. Finally, the first banking directive in 1977 created the 
Banking Advisory Committee (BAC). The BAC started to work in 1979 and aimed at 
reviewing general progress on harmonisation in EEC banking regulation. All these groupings 
kept close links with each other and sometimes involved the same people.4 As EEC committees 
were part of a broader project of harmonisation of the conditions for banking activities, they 
often produced fruitful studies and ambitious projects. However, the most appropriate scale for 
appreciating international banking markets included the other countries that were part of the 
G10-based committee, the BCBS. Therefore, the work of the Basel Committee proved more 
influential at the international level. This article examines the interactions between these two 
levels – EEC and G10 – and analyses two related projects as case studies: the adoption of 
consolidation of banks' balance sheet as a supervisory technique and the development of a 
common framework for analysing banks' capital adequacy. It shows that EEC groupings played 
a crucial role in bringing together European countries on common technical solutions and 
fostering the internationalisation of regulatory standards, but failed to exert a strong influence 
on international banking regulation and to develop a regional specificity. 
                                                          
3The Group of Ten included Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was initially called 
Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. See Charles A. E. Goodhart, The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision: a history of the early years, 1974-1997 (Cambridge ; New York ; 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
4 Alexis Drach, “Basel Banking Supervisors and the Construction of an International Standard-Setter 
Institution,” in Financial Elites and European Banking: Historical Perspectives, ed. Youssef Cassis and 
Giuseppe Telesca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 209–36. 
The literature on international banking regulation has given overwhelming importance 
to the United States, Japan, and to the United Kingdom, as well as to the balance of power 
between financial systems or their respective states.5 The role of the EEC, however, was critical 
in the first steps of international banking supervision, and was not only driven by state 
bargaining, but also supported by supervisors, playing the role of experts, who had to devise 
new tools for internationalising their practices. On the other hand, the European integration 
historiography still overlooks how its policies in the field of banking and finance were shaped 
in a global context, while these policies were critical in the road towards Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).6 By using the archives from the Banque de France, the Bank of 
England, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the British Bankers’ Association 
(BBA), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), and the European Union (EU), this 
article sheds light on the interweaving of global and European concerns and contexts in the 
regulation of a capitalism on the move.  
 
 
1. The EEC, the G10 and the development of new institutional structures in banking 
supervision from the 1970s’ 
                                                          
5Ethan B. Kapstein, Supervising International Banks: Origins and Implications of the Basle Accord (Princeton, 
N.J: International Finance Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 1991); Duncan R. Wood, 
Governing Global Banking: The Basel Committee and the Politics of Financial Globalisation (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005); David Andrew Singer, Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial 
System (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2010); Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
An exception is Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Banking Union in Historical Perspective: The Initiative of the 
European Commission in the 1960s–1970s,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54/4 (2016), 913-27. 
6An exception is Josette Farges-Cazenove, “Construire Le Marché Bancaire Européen : Modalités de 
Gouvernance de la Commission Européenne et Rôle des Comités d’experts (1969-1989)” (PhD diss., Paris-
Sorbonne University, 2017). For a more general account on how European integration and Western European 
leaders tackled the challenge of globalization in the 1970s and 1980s, see Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe 
in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis, Abingdon, New 
York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018). 
The 1970s witnessed the return of financial and economic crises, after a period of 
relative prosperity. The end of the Bretton Woods system led to a sharp increase in foreign 
exchange risk and exchange rate volatility. The oil shock of 1973 severely hit the economy of 
oil importer countries, and a considerable responsibility was given to Western banks to finance 
countries' deficits with the deposits coming from oil surpluses.7 After decades of financial 
stability, banking crises and failures developed again. The secondary banking crisis in late 1973 
in the United Kingdom, the failure of Franklin National in the United States and of Bankhaus 
Herstatt in Germany in 1974, are well-known examples of the new risks of the period.8 
However, banks managed to take advantage from this crisis environment, and continued to 
expand around the world.9 The euro-dollar market developed dramatically, and international 
credit experienced unprecedented growth, boosted by the oil shock and the recycling 
phenomenon whereby the surpluses made in the OPEC countries were deposited in Western 
banks, primarily in London. In parallel, large banks were considerably expanding their 
international network and establishing branches and subsidiaries all over the world. Therefore, 
in the banking sector, the 1970s were characterised both by a return of risk and by new 
opportunities. This trend was a serious challenge for authorities as banks became increasingly 
complex organisations with many foreign establishments of different legal status and different 
financial significance. Authorities often lacked information on these foreign establishments. 
Cooperation and coordination in banking regulation and supervision became critical. As a 
                                                          
7William G. Gray, “Learning to ‘Recycle’: Petrodollars and the West, 1973-5.” In Elisabetta Bini, Giuliano 
Garavini, and Federico Romero, eds., Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis and Its Economic Legacy, (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2016), 172-197; Edoardo Carlo Altamura, European Banks and the Rise of International Finance: The 
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Joan E. Spero, The Failure of the Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International Banking System. 
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9Altamura, European Banks and the Rise of International Finance ; see also Geoffrey Jones, ed., Banks as 
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consequence, banking supervision was acquiring increasing importance in banking regulation, 
in Europe and elsewhere, because of the increasing risks incurred by banks, but also because 
of the distortion in competition the diversity of supervisory standards could create. 
At the EEC level, this context was interwoven with that of the Common Market agenda. 
The European Commission and the EEC Member States took early initiatives to foster the 
international coordination of banking legislations and the control of banks' international 
activities. In 1965, the European Commission initiated work on the possibility for 
harmonisation of the legal and administrative provisions applicable to banks in the various 
member states.10 A few years later, in mid-1972, supervisors from EEC countries 
spontaneously decided in mid-1972 to meet regularly on an informal basis and to discuss 
common issues within the “Groupe de Contact.” In parallel, the Commission was working on 
an ambitious directive project to harmonise banking legislations. The directive proposal faced 
considerable resistance, particularly from the United Kingdom which was joining the EEC, and 
was eventually abandoned.11 Instead, a liberalisation directive was adopted on 28 June 1973 to 
remove restrictions to the freedom of establishment within the Community.12 It focused on the 
liberalisation of credit services, but could not have a far-reaching impact as these services 
depended on the liberalisation of capital transactions, which was still limited.13 Another 
directive passed in 1977, called the first banking coordination directive, was a first step towards 
harmonisation.14 The 1977 directive called for the writing of subsequent directives on specific 
                                                          
10Bank of England Archives (BEA), 8A48/10, “Note for the European Conservative Group in the European 
Parliament”, January 1975. See also Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Banking Union in Historical Perspective.” 
11Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Banking Union in Historical Perspective.” 
12“Council Directive of 28 June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom 
to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks and other financial institutions”, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31973L0183&from=EN [accessed 31 March 2018]. 
13Banque de France (BDF), 1749200912/266, “A Legal Framework for International Supervision: The EEC 
Model”, H. Muller, in Bank Administration Institute, Issues in bank regulation. The Role of International 
Supervision in Banking, summer 1984. 
14“First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions”, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31977L0780&from=EN [accessed 31 March 2018]. 
policy issues and for the establishment of the BAC, a high-profile committee to review progress 
on harmonisation.15 Three groups played an important role in this field at the international 
level: the Groupe de Contact, the BAC, and the BCBS. 
The EEC Groupe de Contact was an informal gathering of banking supervisors from 
EEC member countries.16 Their views did not engage the responsibility of their institution, and 
their discussions were not supposed to lead to any decision, but merely to improve banking 
supervision through the exchange of information. Each member country hosted the meetings 
in turn. The European Commission sent an observer to the group from 1975 on. Some countries 
opposed the officialising of the Groupe de Contact, most notably France, which refused to 
delegate sovereignty on such matters as banking control.17 The group exchanged information 
on individual banking institutions, discussed national developments in banking regulation, and 
carried on comparative studies on various aspects of banking supervision.  
The creation of the EEC Banking Advisory Committee was requested by the EEC 
directive of 1977, but first met in early 1979 only. In 1974, the Commission already hoped to 
have an official forum for the cooperation of EEC supervisors and to use the already existing 
Groupe de Contact for this purpose.18 However, this project was refused by the institutions and 
member states involved because they considered that the informal and confidential nature of 
the Groupe de Contact was useful and had to be preserved. While government officials were 
to attend the meetings of the Groupe de Contact, they would not be able to discuss confidential 
issues anymore, because of banking secrecy rules. The Commission thus decided to create the 
                                                          
15Bank for International Settlements Archives (BISA), 1.3a(3) F, Sixteenth meeting of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 28 and 29 June 1979. 
16BFA, 1749200912/266, “The Contact Groupe of EEC Supervisory Authorities”, Schneider, in Issues in Bank 
Regulation, 8, 1, Summer 1984. 
17 BFA, 1749200912/298, “Note pour le Gouverneur,” Secretary from the French Banks’ Control Commission, 
18 September 1974. 
18 BFA, 1749200912/331, “International Conference of Bank supervisors, Washington, 24-25 September 1981: 
‘The development of co-operation between bank supervisory authorities in the European Economic 
Community’”, Jean Bonnardin. 
BAC as a forum to discuss policy issues and lay down the guidelines for the coordination 
process within the Community. From 1979 on, the Groupe de Contact became a technical 
committee providing help to the BAC, which enjoyed a higher status in the EEC institutional 
structure. Each member country and the Commission could send up to three delegates. The 
Commission provided the secretariat, and the committee met in Brussels, usually twice a year. 
The BAC’s work programme as defined in a preparatory meeting in December 1978 included 
the definition of observation ratios, the establishment of a precise list of authorisation criteria, 
liquidation procedures, harmonisation of banks' published accounts and prudential returns, and 
the establishment of a European risk credit exchange.19 Its two first fields of work were the use 
of consolidation as a supervisory technique and the definition of observation ratios. 
At the level of the Group of Ten countries, the central bank governors established the 
BCBS in late 1974 in order to have a forum to discuss common regulatory issues. Goodhart 
stresses the European origins of the Committee,20 but this committee also resulted from an 
American initiative. From 1972, American authorities had started a transnational negotiation 
with European countries, Canada, and a few Asian countries, with a view to establishing a new 
banking legislation for foreign banks in the US.21 An EEC and an American exercise of 
international coordination in banking regulation thus coexisted from quite an early stage. The 
United States was eager to have the opportunity to discuss regulatory issues with other, 
particularly European, countries. Unlike the EEC groupings, the BCBS had no legal 
instruments – such as an EEC directive in the case of the BAC – to implement its 
recommendations. Initially, the BCBS had no desire to harmonise banking regulation 
                                                          
19BFA, 1749200912/331, “International Conference of Bank supervisors, Washington, 24-25 September 1981: 
‘The development of co-operation between bank supervisory authorities in the European Economic 
Community’”, Jean Bonnardin. 
20Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
21Archives of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NYFRA), central files, box 615771, Office 
correspondence from Mitchell and Daane to the Board of Governors: “Foreign Banks in the United States”, 20 
November 1972. 
internationally, but only to exchange on best practices. However, its membership included 
major players in the international financial scene, most importantly the United States and Japan, 
and therefore its influence would progressively become more important than that of the EEC 
groupings. 
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was more formal than the Groupe de 
Contact, and more closely linked to central banks. It included twelve countries, the Group of 
Ten plus Switzerland and Luxembourg. Two delegates represented each country, instead of 
one for the Group de Contact. The BCBS met at the Bank for International Settlements, in 
Basel, usually three times a year. Goodhart has stressed the close links that existed between the 
two groups.22 In particular, there was a significant membership overlap between them. The 
Basel Committee conducted similar work to that of the Groupe de Contact, but also had to 
respond to specific questions raised by the governors. The BCBS members were first asked to 
consider the establishment of an early warning system, but failed to do so because of the critical 
differences between countries and of the refusal to delegate supervisory powers.23 From a 
relatively modest group in 1975, the Basel Committee evolved into a central institution in the 
field of international banking regulation. It originated the first worldwide standard on banks' 
capital adequacy in 1988. 
 This network of international committees was composed of banking supervisors, 
central bankers, and civil servants from ministries of finance from each country. National 
idiosyncrasies aside, banking supervision was an already existing activity or profession at the 
national level. Its importance, both regarding staff number and policy input, grew all along the 
1970s, the 1980s and 1990s. The members of the Groupe de Contact were often also seating 
on the Basel Committee. Membership overlap with the BAC was smaller, because the BAC 
                                                          
22Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
23Catherine R. Schenk, “Summer in the City.” 
members enjoyed a higher profile and were more often coming from other institutions than 
those represented on the Basel Committee and the Contact group. Some members have been 
part of all three committees, however, although not concurrently: Huib Muller, for instance, 
head of banking supervision at the Nederlandsche Bank, was an early member of the Groupe 
de Contact and Basel Committee, then chaired the EEC Banking Advisory Committee from 
1982 to 1985, and finally chaired the Basel Committee from 1988 to 1991.24  EEC members of 
the Basel Committee always informed their non-EEC colleagues of recent developments in 
banking regulation in the Community.  
 The international network of banking supervisors was not limited to the EEC and G10 
levels. From 1979 on, the Basel Committee organised international conferences, usually every 
two years, gathering supervisors from all over the world. These conferences were occasions 
for supervisors from distant countries to meet and for the Basel Committee to circulate some 
of its papers and establish its reputation. They were also occasions for the EEC groups to 
present their work. In the 1981 conference organised in Washington, Jean Bonnardin, chairman 
of the EEC Groupe de Contact and French delegate from the Commission de Contrôle des 
Banques, delivered a speech on “the development of co-operation between bank supervisory 
authorities in the European Economic Community.”25 He gave a historical overview of banking 
regulation and supervision in the EEC context. Besides, other regional groups of supervisors 
were progressively established from 1979 on: the offshore group of supervisors, the supervisors 
from the Gulf countries, from Latin America and the Caribbean, and from South East Asia, 
New-Zealand and Australia, for instance.26 Finally, the Basel Committee often circulated its 
                                                          
24Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.” 
25BFA, 1749200912/331, “International Conference of Bank supervisors, Washington, 24-25 September 1981: 
‘The development of co-operation between bank supervisory authorities in the European Economic 
Community’”, Jean Bonnardin. 
26BFA, 1749200912/266, International Conference of Banking Supervisors. Banca d'Italia - Rome, September 
13-14, 1984, “Report by S. Aoki, as the representative of SEANZA countries”; BFA, 1749200912/355, “The 
Basle Supervisors Committee. Remarks by J.S. Beverly, May 24, 1985”, Fifth Assembly of the Commission of 
Latin American and Caribbean Banking Supervisory and Inspection Authorities, Barbados, 23 and 24 May 
papers to supervisors from non-G10 countries and asked for comments. This was for example 
the case of the report BS/77/52 on consolidation, but more generally of most important reports 
written by the Basel Committee.27 The EEC groupings on banking regulation and supervision 
were thus closely integrated into a global network of supervisors exchanging on important 
issues of the time. If the Basel Committee became the core of this network at the global level, 
the EEC groups were often at the forefront of international cooperation because of the broader 
ambition of the European integration project.  
 
2. A global turn for the supervisory authorities: The consolidation technique between the 
EEC and the Group of Ten 
The case of consolidation as a supervisory technique sheds light on the interconnection 
between the EEC and the G10 level. It also shows how new methods were developed 
internationally in order to adapt to the global expansion of banking. The technique of 
consolidation consists in taking into consideration all the activities of banking groups 
worldwide when assessing their soundness, by aggregating the balance sheets of all foreign 
subsidiaries and branches. In the 1970s, foreign branches (legally dependent entities from the 
head office) were usually already consolidated to the domestic bank, but foreign subsidiaries 
(legally independent from the head office) were not.28 Although it may seem a purely technical 
matter, the practice of consolidation had a wide-ranging effect. It meant the replacement of a 
legal approach by an economic approach to banking organisations, and changed the limits of 
the entity to which regulations were applied. To some extent, therefore, the use of consolidation 
expanded regulation beyond national borders. Consolidation was therefore both a new 
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27BISA, 1.3a(3) 1982/17, “ Past circulation of Committee documents”. 
28BISA, 1.3a(3), 1977/7, BS/77/52f, “Consolidation des bilans des banques: le regroupement des actifs à 
risques, envisagé comme méthode de contrôle de la solvabilité des banques”, H. Coljé, October 1978. 
technique of surveillance and an extension of states’ sovereignty, and thereby a political move 
reinforcing the responsibility of the parent authority – as opposed to the host authority – for 
controlling an international bank. It also reinforced banks’ main office responsibility towards 
their international subsidiaries. Consolidation accounting was not in itself a new idea, and was 
not only applied to banks. The principle of consolidation dated back to the 19th century in the 
United States.29 Consolidated accounting and consolidated supervision were, however, two 
different things. Consolidated accounting mostly related to accounting information, whereas 
consolidated supervision concerned the application of supervisory rules on a bank taking into 
account all its operations worldwide. Between the early 1970s and the mid-1980, most 
countries adopted the principle of consolidation to base their supervisory practices. However, 
consolidation was not limited to European activities of large international banks, which were 
already operating at a global scale. Therefore, while European groups were eager to advocate 
the use of this technique because of their early reflection on international regulatory and 
supervisory issues, this technique had a global, not a European, reach.  
The rise in international banking and the lack of regulation and supervision in some 
countries induced the need for consolidation. Indeed, if a bank established a subsidiary in a 
country where regulation was inadequate or inexistent, it could circumvent the regulation of its 
country of origin through this subsidiary. By taking into account all the operations of a bank 
worldwide, particularly when applying solvency ratios, the consolidation technique could 
therefore prevent these “gaps” in the supervisory system.30 The rising importance of offshore 
centres, where no or little regulation was in place, was an important reason why consolidation 
                                                          
29Didier Bensadon, “La frontière comptable de l’entité groupe : évolution du concept de périmètre de 
consolidation des comptes du milieu des années 1960 à la loi du 3 janvier 1985”, Entreprises et histoire 39/2 
(2005): 8-22.   
30BISA, 1.3a(3), 1977/7, BS/77/52f, “Consolidation des bilans des banques: le regroupement des actifs à 
risques, envisagé comme méthode de contrôle de la solvabilité des banques”, H. Coljé, October 1978. 
was favoured by supervisory authorities.31 In the second half of the 1970s, the supervisors from 
most industrialised countries had serious concerns about the increasing number of these 
offshore centres, and the Basel Committee set a working agenda about this topic.32 The 
consolidation principle was one way of coping with this challenge. Authorities both wanted 
better information and a way to prevent international banks from escaping supervisory rules.  
The EEC Groupe de Contact discussed the topic of consolidation before the Basel 
Committee did. In October 1976, the Dutch delegate Hugo Coljé (who was part of both groups) 
told his colleagues in Basel that he was writing a paper on the technique of consolidation for 
the Groupe de Contact, and that the Basel Committee also may wish to discuss this topic.33 
When the Basel Committee first discussed a paper written by Coljé in October 1977, the 
Groupe de Contact had already examined the paper two times.34 Coljé explained that the topic 
was closely related to the development of offshore centres. He stressed that foreign subsidiaries 
could represent a serious risk for the entire banking organisation, and that authorities had a 
moral responsibility towards these establishments, and not only a legal responsibility. Among 
the EEC countries, the Netherlands was the most active promoters of consolidation. Countries 
were at a different stage of reflection on the question, however. The United States and the 
Netherlands were very favourable to the use of this technique, whereas the Japanese and French 
authorities were just starting to think about it. Swedish supervisors were usually opposed to 
consolidation because it required a substantial work due to the specificities of foreign banking 
subsidiaries from Nordic countries.35 The Basel Committee could exert more influence than 
                                                          
31BISA, 1.3a(3) F, Eleventh meeting of the Basel Committee, 27 and 28 October 1977; on the history of 
offshore centres, see Vanessa Ogle, “Archipelago Capitalism: Tax Havens, Offshore Money, and the State, 
1950s–1970s.” The American Historical Review 122/5 (2017): 1431–58.  
32BISA, 1.3a(3) F, Eleventh meeting of the Basel Committee, 27 and 28 October 1977.   
33BISA, 1.3a(3) F, Eighth meeting of the Basel Committee, 28 and 29 October 1976. 
34BISA, 1.3a(3) F, Eleventh meeting of the Basel Committee, 27 and 28 October 1977. 
35BISA, 1.3a(3) F, Thirteenth meeting of the Basel Committee, 29 and 30 June 1978. 
the Groupe de Contact, however, because it could write recommendations to the Group of Ten 
governors who could then use their influence to make changes in national regulations.  
The Basel Committee recommended the governors to support the adoption of consolidation 
as a supervisory technique in two reports. The BCBS sent the first report in September 1978 to 
the governors,36 who strongly endorsed it and asked for another report giving more directives.37 
Another report was submitted in March 1979, advocating the implementation of the 
consolidation principle as soon as possible. The practice of consolidation had practical 
consequences. For example, when the Swiss authorities started to control the capitalisation of 
their banks on a consolidated basis, it revealed serious weaknesses in several individual cases, 
because some banks had used subsidiaries in less-regulated countries to circumvent domestic 
regulations.38 In January 1979, the Dutch delegation of the newly formed BAC used the work 
of the Basel Committee to invite the EEC to work on the topic.39 
The initiative taken at the Group of Ten countries level indeed pressed the EEC to set an 
agenda for a directive. In May 1979, the governors of the Group of Ten countries discussed the 
report of the Basel Committee and accepted its recommendations.40 The president of the 
governors of the Group of Ten countries, Jelle Zijstra from the Nederlandsche Bank, then wrote 
on 15 June to the G10 governors to underline the agreement of the desirability of consolidation 
and press each country for taking early initiatives in to implement this principle.41 In July, the 
Basel Committee organised the first international conference of banking supervisors in 
London, which gave further impetus to the consolidation principle by going beyond the Group 
                                                          
36BISA, 1.3a(3), 1982/17, “Past circulation of Committee documents”, 1982. 
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38BISA, 1.3a(3) F, Sixteenth meeting of the Basel Committee, 28 and 29 June 1979. 
39BFA, 1749200912/295, XV/266/79, Letter from Claus Köhler to the members of the Banking Advisory 
Committee, 9 October 1979. 
40BFA, 1749200912/310; “Copy of letter from President Ziljstra to other G-10 Governors”, 15 June 1979. 
41Ibid. 
of Ten countries.42 In October 1979, Claus Köhler, Bundesbank delegate and chairman of the 
newly formed Banking Advisory Committee, wrote to its members to suggest the BAC to 
recommend consolidated supervision in the EEC, to create a working group to take care of the 
technical details, and to start with listing existing practices in consolidated supervision. At its 
December 1979 meeting, the BAC asked the Commission to draft a directive proposal making 
consolidation compulsory within the EEC, together with a report on practices already existing 
in the field.43 The BAC asked to have a first draft to discuss for its 19 June 1980 meeting.44 
Between 1980 and 1983 three EEC groupings worked on the drafting of a directive on 
consolidation: the Coordination of Banking Legislations Group, which devised the draft, the 
Banking Advisory Committee, which discussed it, and the Groupe de Contact, which focused 
on the technical details. The first meeting of the Coordination of Banking Legislations Group 
on this matter took place on 14-15 April 1980. The British and the Dutch members favoured a 
general directive in order to go faster, while the German members underlined that the first step 
should be the removal of obstacles to consolidation. The Italian delegates stressed that their 
institutions did not have the necessary powers to apply the consolidation principle in the way 
the draft directive was hoping. Interestingly, some delegations also noted that the consolidation 
principle should be considered at the global level, and not at the EEC level only. In their view, 
the EEC move could only be part of a broader approach. 
The following discussions at the Banking Advisory Committee soon revealed the 
challenges raised by the consolidation technique. One challenge was that of sovereignty, 
because of the problems raised by on-site inspection by foreign supervisors and the exchange 
                                                          
42BFA, 1749200912/355, “International Conference of Banking Supervisors. London July 5-6 1979. Record of 
proceedings”. 
43BFA, 1749200912/331, XV/43/80, “Consolidation. Document de travail pour la première réunion du groupe 
de travail de la commission sur la coordination des législations bancaires”. 
44BFA, 1749200912/295, XV/144/80 “Consolidation. Compte rendu de la réunion du Groupe de travail sur la 
coordination des législations bancaires, tenue à Bruxelles les 14 et 15 avril 1980”. 
of confidential information between countries. Another complication was that of the type of 
regulation and scope of consolidation. At the BAC meeting of 4 December 1980, the British 
members opposed the compulsory character of consolidation and, with the Luxembourg 
delegates, favoured flexibility.45 The delegates from Luxembourg were particularly opposed to 
on-site inspections by foreign authorities as well as to pressing Member States for signing 
bilateral agreements in this matter. Overall, Luxembourg preferred simple recommendations 
to a directive and opposed the EEC exercise.46 Consolidation in practice raised serious 
challenges: an internal note from the French Commission de contrôle bancaire stressed the 
difficulty posed by the differences of accounting standards, by the definition of the extent of 
consolidation, and by the fact that there was no legal definition of a group in French law.47 
Major disagreements arose about how consolidation should be applied to subsidiaries not 
owned entirely by the parent bank, and even more in the case of minority participation.48  
Commercial banks lamented to be largely excluded from the discussions. On 27 February 
1980, the Commission informed European banking associations of its project to submit a draft 
directive on consolidation to the Council by the end of the year.49 In a circular letter to the 
central committee of the European Banking Federation (EBF), the EBF stressed the importance 
of the project for the European Commission, which was considered as “the corner stone of all 
future harmonization.”50 The EBF pointed out that as consolidation was reinforcing the home 
authority in regulation and supervision it would probably lead to distortions of competition in 
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the host country, and thereby call for further harmonisation.51 The EBF was suspicious that the 
Commission had hidden intentions of wide-reaching harmonisation, which it opposed. At a 
meeting in May 1981, several members of the EBF said that “the Commission tended to 
harmonise for the sake of harmonisation and they should be encouraged to concentrate much 
more on liberty of establishment and the freedom of services and competition.”52 The EBF 
considered that not only the BIS or the IMF had a global reach that the EEC did not have, but 
also more more importantly that their agreements were more flexible.53 Overall, the EBF 
opposed the directive as being too formal and as having too small a geographical reach, but the 
EBF could not block the process. On a technical level the EBF discussed in particular the 
minimum participation in a subsidiary for consolidation to be recommended.54 The initial 
Commission’s proposal was 10%, but the EBF proposed 25% as a compromise. The German 
banks were particularly opposed to this principle, and favoured a 50% participation or, 
preferably, an “effective control” criterion.55 The final version of the directive included the 
EBF suggestion of a minimum 25% holding for recommended participation and mentioned the 
effective control criterion.56  
The adoption of the consolidation principle was very uneven among EEC countries by the 
early 1980s. Whereas some European countries, notably the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, already used the technique of consolidation, others did not apply it, or not fully, for 
different reasons. In Italy, the central bank did not have access to enough information to 
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implement it.57 In the summer 1982, the spectacular failure of the Banco Ambrosiano, an Italian 
bank with several offshore subsidiaries and a non-bank holding company in Luxembourg, 
would soon be a strong impetus for the adoption of consolidation.58 In Germany, the legislative 
framework for consolidation did not exist in the early 1980s, as it necessitated a revision of the 
banking law.59 In the meantime, authorities had to rely on a gentlemen’s agreement with the 
central association of the German banks by which they had to provide audited reports on the 
annual accounts of their wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries.60 Consolidation became 
compulsory in 1985.61 In France, on the other hand, banks had an interest to consolidation, 
because French banks’ foreign subsidiaries usually had higher solvency ratios than the main 
office.62  
The story of consolidation thus started in EEC groupings, was given further impetus in 
Basel, and in return this impetus and support at the G10 level prompted a policy agenda at the 
Commission. The consolidation technique circulated back and forth between the G10 and EEC 
level in a mutually reinforcing way. Most of the consolidation directive was already drafted by 
the end of 1981, and the final text was eventually issued on 13 June 1983.63 In a report of a 
visit to the Commission in June 1983, a delegate from the British Bankers’ Association said 
that “the adoption of the Directive by the Council of Ministers was clearly regarded as 
something of a triumph for the Commission,” but showed reserve regarding its actual 
importance.64 In the EEC, however, the consolidation principle was part of a broader project. 
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The Commission’s aim was to make consolidation compulsory and to harmonise the prudential 
returns (the documents required for banking supervision) submitted to the authorities by the 
banks.65 The EEC exercise was thus closely linked to a desire to improve and harmonise 
information on international banking within the Common Market.66 This wish was also made 
clear with the initiative of European institutions in the field of observation ratios.  
 
 
3. A European initiative in global rules on capital: the EEC observation ratios. 
Capital adequacy ratios are relations established between own funds and assets of 
banks’ balance sheets to ensure that each bank has a minimum capital to conduct its operations. 
A considerable literature has been written on the adoption of a common capital adequacy ratio 
by the Basel Committee in 1988.67 Most of this literature gives a vital role – if not a unique 
role – to the pressure imposed by the United States and the United Kingdom on the other 
countries of the Group of Ten to accept a uniform rule for banks' capital adequacy. While a 
complete review of the construction of the international standard is outside the scope of this 
article, the following section stresses, on the contrary, the early initiative and importance of the 
EEC in the international convergence of capital adequacy standards, and its failure to stand as 
a homogeneous bloc. In the field of banking regulation, banks' capital became a central topic 
of discussion in the 1980s. First, it was seen as a means to ensure the stability of banks, and 
thereby, of the international financial system as a whole. Second, the harmonisation of capital 
adequacy standards internationally became a cornerstone of the “level playing field,” that is, 
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equal competitive conditions for banks from different countries. Thus, these two concerns, 
stability preservation and competitive conditions, converged in a single policy issue which 
became crucial at the European level, but even more at the G10 level. The exercise of capital 
adequacy convergence was partly crisis-driven, as the International Debt Crisis of 1982 pressed 
the authorities, particularly in the United States, to reinforce the soundness of their banks. 
However, in Europe, the exercise had started long before the Debt Crisis. Furthermore, it was 
also motivated by the erosion of banks’ capitalisation in each country and by the increasing 
competition between international banks intensified by the liberalisation of the financial sector.  
The history of banks’ capital regulation is a history of a technical question that 
progressively became an international political issue and a cornerstone of the global financial 
regulatory system. Its international political dimension gained unprecedented influence in the 
1980s, whereas previously it had been only one tool among others for assessing banks’ 
soundness at the national level. The United Kingdom had little or informal use of ratios, 
whereas most – but not all – other European countries had formal regulations on solvency ratios 
relating different elements of banks’ balance sheet. However, these regulations were very 
heterogeneous and linked to each national regulatory environment and banking system. In the 
1970s, however, three structural evolutions in the financial sector, and more generally, in 
capitalism, challenged these national regulations. The growth of banks’ balance sheets, 
meaning the increasing activities of banks despite high inflation levels, was a first crucial 
evolution.68 They had an impact on solvency ratios, as assets were growing faster than deposits. 
A second fundamental change was the rise of liability management and in the introduction of 
new liabilities items, such as subordinated debts, as banks were increasingly using new non-
deposit funding sources for their activities.69 These new funding sources considerably 
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challenged the very definition of capital, as some countries accepted to include them in the 
definition of a bank’ own funds and some others did not. Lastly, the increasing 
internationalisation of the banking sector shed light on and intensified competitive distortions 
between countries. Because of these three fundamental evolutions, discussions on banks’ 
capital were widespread in regulatory fields in the 1970s, particularly in the United States, but 
increasingly also in Europe. However, these discussions mostly took place at the technical 
supervisory level, and had no far-reaching political agenda. 
Once again, the Groupe de Contact discussed the issue of capitalisation before the Basel 
Committee did. Both committees addressed the topic well before the 1980s. In December 1975, 
the first year of existence of the Basel Committee, the delegate from Luxembourg, Claude 
Schmit, presented a paper from the Groupe de Contact entitled “The definition of capital and 
the use of subordinated debt”.70 The paper was mostly an attempt to review EEC countries’ 
regulatory practices in the field of capital requirement and their attitude towards subordinated 
debts.71 The US delegates were particularly keen on discussing the topic, and were interested 
in having a catalogue of countries’ practices.72 Like in many other instances, a member who 
was seating on both committees informed the Basel Committee of the work of the Groupe de 
Contact and circulated some of its documents. At the same meeting, the Basel Committee then 
discussed the question of the capital endowment of branches of foreign banks in a given 
country,73 a topic which triggered lengthy discussions over several meetings. In the 1970s, 
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however, most exchanges on capital were focused on technical questions, which were 
important for banking supervision, but had no political implications. This situation changed 
with the first EEC banking coordination directive of 1977, and more precisely with the early 
work of the BAC in 1979. Later on, first in 1982 and decidedly in 1984, the topic of bank 
capital became critical at the Basel Committee level.74  
In the EEC context, the two dimensions of international regulation of bank capital, 
ensuring financial stability and equal competitive conditions at the international level, were 
complemented by a third one, that of the completion of the Common Market and, more 
generally, that of the European integration process. The work on bank capital by the EEC was 
therefore also connected to its other endeavours in the field of consolidation and other areas, 
such as the annual accounts of banks. The provisions for working on common banking ratios 
in the EEC were provided by the 1977 first banking directive75 and were in fact already present 
in the 1972 directive proposal eventually abandoned.76 Compared to the Basel exercise, this 
was a very early step. The 1977 directive stated that “appropriate structural ratios should be 
formulated that will make it possible within the framework of cooperation between national 
authorities to observe, in accordance with standard methods, the position of comparable types 
of credit institutions.”77 The 1977 directive argued that such ratios had to be devised, “pending 
further coordination,” because “equivalent financial requirements for credit institutions [were] 
necessary to ensure similar safeguards for savers and fair conditions of competition between 
comparable groups of credit institutions.”78 For the purpose of these ratios, the 1977 directive 
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also called for the harmonisation of credit institutions’ accounts. The intended ratios had to 
focus on banks’ solvency and liquidity, without further detail. As in Basel, solvency ratios, 
focussing on banks’ capital, would prove more important than liquidity ratios.  
The Commission contemplated different types of ratios but these ratios were not 
supposed to have any normative dimension, at least during their first stage, and were therefore 
called “observation” ratios. In late 1979, the newly established BAC asked the Groupe de 
Contact to start working on four distinct solvency ratios it had devised.79 These ratios related 
own funds to risk-weighted assets, other liabilities, large exposures, and fixed assets. Each 
country chose a sample of banks on which to base the calculations. First calculations began in 
1981 with the data from the year 1980.80 The exercise was repeated and improved each year. 
By comparison, the Basel Committee only started to work on banks' capitalisation thoroughly 
in 1982, and only initiated a policy agenda in this field in 1984, under pressure from Paul 
Volcker, president of the US Federal Reserve. By that time, European members of the Basel 
Committee had already gained wide expertise and experience in the international comparison 
of banks' capital adequacy.  
The BAC discussed matters which would later prove central to the Basel exercise. This 
included, for instance, the definition of own funds and the weighting of risk assets.81 As for the 
Basel Committee later on, the European groupings faced serious challenges due to national 
differences in regulation and accounting standards. For instance, two different definitions of 
own funds were retained, one including subordinated debt and the other not, in order to satisfy 
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the irreconcilable views between the German members, who strongly opposed their inclusion, 
and other countries which favoured it.82 Likewise, finding a satisfying weighting system for 
banking assets was difficult. Borrowers were divided into three categories, public sector, 
banking sector, and non-banking private sector, but these categories and their respective 
weightings were often criticised for being over simplistic. Since the very beginning of the 
exercise, supervisors and bankers expressed serious reservations. For instance, German banks 
wondered to what extent these ratios could “produce comparable and realistic results,” because 
of the differences in accounting rules and banking structures.83 The differences in the items 
included in own funds by each country were very significant, which led to very exploratory 
results and serious reservations also from the part of national supervisors.84 Most importantly, 
the members of the Groupe de Contact could not definitely agree on a common definition of 
own funds nor a common weighting system for risk assets.85  
The European Banking Federation, which was informed of the exercise, did not favour 
those ratios. First and foremost, the EBF questioned their “observatory” nature, and feared that 
ratios would be used to homogenise supervisory requirements.86 The EBF further argued that 
ratios did not provide a satisfying basis for comparing banking solvency across the EEC 
because of the widely diverging banking systems and fiscal and legal environments. In 
addition, the EBF claimed that the administrative costs implied for banks by these ratios far 
outweighed their potential benefits. Finally, the EBF pointed to several technical problems, 
particularly in its assessment of country risk. The EEC proposal included a different weighting 
according to the country of origin of the borrower, and grouped countries in two categories, 
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the EEC and industrialised countries on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other 
hand. The EBF considered the proposed scheme was far too simplistic. The EBF position, 
however, concealed diverging views between countries. 
The British Bankers’ Association, for instance, was sympathetic to the Commission’s 
endeavour to set a common definition own funds across EEC member states, particularly in the 
context of consolidated supervision.87 However, the BBA had serious concerns that a single 
definition of own funds would be used for all purposes: in the United Kingdom own funds 
included different components depending on each purpose, for example calculating the gearing 
ratio (own funds related to all assets without weighting) and the risk assets ratio (own funds 
related to all assets weighted according to the risk they carry). Concerning the establishment 
of a specific minimum requirement in own funds, the BBA’s view was unequivocal: “The 
B.B.A. is very much opposed to the idea that a common specific amount should be imposed 
throughout the Community. […] [3] The British practice is for each institution to discuss its 
ratios individually with the Bank of England as the supervisory authority, which takes into 
account the size, business and experience of the institution in question. The B.B.A. 
recommends that a similar flexible approach is adopted by all supervisory authorities 
throughout the Community.”88 However, through the rest of the decade, the battle for capital 
ratios harmonisation would progressively converge precisely on a common minimum standard 
for all international banks, this time not under pressure from the EEC, but rather from the 
United States, with the support of the United Kingdom. 
The collection of data for the calculation of the EEC observation ratios was more than 
just a technical question. Data collection pushed Member States to devise a scheme in which 
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comparisons were meaningful. Members of the Coordination of Banking Legislations Group 
discussed for instance what type and size of banks to include in the sample, or what kind of 
national average to calculate, arithmetic (all banks weighing the same) or weighted (big banks 
weighing more than small ones).89 Furthermore, differences in own funds’ definition 
undermined the results’ comparability. Each country used its domestic rules in place. In 
Luxembourg, banks considered it unfair to apply similar weightings to off and on balance sheet 
items.90 Data collection from banks often necessitated additional accounting work. For 
instance, in a letter dated from 11 June 1982 enclosing its data, the Crédit Agricole underlined 
that information required did not correspond to the accounting categories used by the bank and 
necessitated time-consuming reprocessing.91 Each year, the European groupings refined their 
methodology, but could not overcome fundamental national differences, which had to be left 
aside for the sake the exercise. As in the case of the Basel exercise a few years later, the 
apparently solely technical question of counting capital turned out to be a political question 
related to the wish of homogenising standards.  
The results of these calculations had important effects. To some extent, they made clear 
the differences in banks’ capitalisation among EEC member states. In doing so, they had a 
performative dimension, because they focussed the attention on these differences, and 
reinforced the desirability for homogenisation, thereby questioning their merely “observation” 
status. National averages in 1984 varied from 11.8 or 12.9% (weighted or arithmetic) for 
Danemark, to 2.8 or 3.4% for France, 6.9 or 8.3% for the United Kingdom, or 4.9 or 6.1% for 
Germany.92 French banks were the least capitalised of all, whatever the definition used. This 
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fact was well-known in banking spheres, and due to their nationalised status. Banking 
supervisors were particularly anxious to stop the erosion of banks’ capitalisation, which had 
been continuing since the 1970s, and managed to do so in the early 1980s, despite increasing 
differences in EEC member states between 1981 and 1983.93 By the end of 1983, the 
observation ratios exercise was “nearing the end of the experimental stage,” and the BAC was 
considering what would be the next steps.94 Its agenda would be disturbed by the new impetus 
given to the topic by the Basel Committee. 
 In 1984, under pressure from the United States, the Basel Committee set a new agenda 
for devising a standard scheme to define and assess banks’ capital. The Basel Committee had 
already worked on the topic thoroughly since 1982 with the establishment of a working group 
chaired by Frederick Dahl from the Federal Reserve. 95 In 1984, the Basel Committee started 
calculations based on the framework established by the Dahl working group, in the same way 
as the Groupe de Contact had done between 1980 and 1983.96 The European exercise on 
capitalisation did not stop when the Basel Committee firmly engaged on the road to the 
convergence of capital adequacy standards. On the contrary, both exercises continued in 
parallel, and all three committees involved kept close links with each other. As the technical 
question of banks' capital adequacy standard became a political matter involving negotiations 
and power play, the European exercise was used by EEC countries to counterbalance the 
influence of the United States. Some countries, most notably Germany, France, and Japan, were 
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opposed to the adoption of common rules in the field of capital adequacy along the proposed 
guidelines. 
In late 1986, the United Kingdom and the United States opted for a bilateral agreement, 
in order to press the other countries to accelerate the process of convergence.97 This episode 
reflected the failure of the EEC to speak with one voice. The other EEC countries saw the 
United Kingdom as disloyal, but they had no choice but to accept the principle of convergence. 
However, whereas the literature often uses this episode to illustrate the hegemonic power of 
the US financial system, it should be stressed that the European countries agreed on the 
convergence principle because they had started the process themselves, long before the Basel 
Committee, as the previous paragraphs have shown. In addition, the US-UK bilateral 
agreement was a very preliminary project, and voluntarily left room for discussion on the 
details. Furthermore, both European and Basel exercise were evolving around close lines, and 
the differences between the two models were not immense.  Finally, the European commitment 
to the international comparison of banks' capital adequacy played a role in the Japanese consent 
for a common standard.98 Indeed, Japan did not wish to be isolated from the rest of the Group 
of Ten, as the United States and the EEC were all engaging on the road to convergence. 
 
Conclusion 
These two case studies on consolidation and observation ratios show that, to some 
extent, European integration has been a globalisation laboratory. European initiatives in 
international banking regulation and supervision produced tools for international governance 
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and fostered the internationalisation of member states’ politico-institutional structures. The 
very nature of the European integration process fostered an early reflection on international 
banking regulation, well before the Basel Committee, on technical matters such as the use of 
consolidation as a supervisory technique, or on broader regulatory issues such as common 
standards of banks' capital adequacy. The initiatives of the European institutions were more 
linked to the nature of the integration project than to crises, even though the 1973-74 crisis also 
gave them further impetus. However, the economic and financial crisis of the 1970s played a 
crucial role in the background, as it influenced the recycling phenomenon, encouraged the 
development of banking supervision worldwide, and challenged the overall framework for 
economic policy. These developments went hand in hand with a change of regulatory stance, 
favouring liberalisation and market-based mechanisms, in which the EEC played a significant 
role also, by supporting the liberalisation of capital movements. The initiatives of the EEC in 
the field of banking regulation have thus to be examined in regard to those taken in the field of 
the liberalisation of credit services and capital flows. Nonetheless, in all these fields, Europe 
was not alone. The fair competitive conditions that the EEC tried to establish at the Community 
level were soon overtaken by a broader, G10, scale, which suited better the scope of 
international banking.  
The European initiatives in banking regulation and supervision prepared European 
countries for globalisation and gave them experience in this field. In doing so, it also fostered 
globalisation itself, by giving European countries a framework within which to favour 
international exchanges. The role played by European integration in this matter may not have 
been limited to the financial sector, even though European efforts seem to have been more 
reactive than proactive in sectors such as the telecommunication or in the automobile industry, 
which were also marked by regional coordination and competition from the USA and Japan.99 
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However, the financial sector had two distinctive characteristics. First, the rise of international 
banking regulation and supervision in the context of increasing risks of failures and crises gave 
an unprecedented role to international tools of governance like standards of capitalisation. 
Second, the liberalisation of capital flows and coordination of banking legislation played a 
specific role in the project for a possible economic and monetary union, as they were conceived 
as a prerequisite for such a move. 
Connecting capitalism and European integration allows to shed light on three elements: 
the role of national and socioeconomic contexts, the transition from a state-led to a market-led 
capitalism, and the forward-looking dimension of European initiatives. The notion of 
capitalism invites us to link the technical banking issues to a broader context, in particular the 
role of legal affairs, the intertwining of national and international context, the governance of 
enterprises and the labour market. The notion of “global economy,” on the contrary, stresses 
the international dimension but downplays national contexts, and tends to isolate economic 
issues from their social and political background. The notion of capitalism thus helps consider 
banking regulation as part of a system not only connecting national economies, but also 
connecting economic life to this wider context. Furthermore, this article highlighted the role 
played by European integration in the transition from the state-led capitalism of the Bretton 
Wood system to the market-based financial capitalism of the post-Bretton Wood era. The 
notion of capitalism is thus useful in shedding light on the systemic dimension of the changes 
at stake. Lastly, based on Levy’s work on capital as a forward-looking process, it is possible to 
consider the history of European banking regulation also as oriented towards the future.100 In 
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particular, it can be seen as an attempt to establish an ideal market, with fair competition and 
stability, as oriented towards a more efficient common banking market, and towards a possible 
economic and monetary union. In this perspective, European integration in the field of banking 
fits well the history of capitalism proposed by Levy. 
Put differently, European integration adapted capitalism for its own political project, 
but was soon overtaken by it. Capitalism was not limited to Europe and the changes in 
capitalism that the EEC was using to push its integration agenda – such as the 
internationalisation of banks, the growth of banks’ balance sheets, the increased circulation of 
capital movements – were happening elsewhere more or less at the same time. This trend 
created a pressure to go further in harmonisation and liberalisation, in order to keep the 
Community’s uniqueness and pave the way for monetary unification. But capitalism did not 
need European integration to work. Furthermore, the geography of the financial sector was 
more organised around big financial centres such as New York, London and Tokyo than around 
regions such as Europe.101 The European initiatives in the field of banking regulation pushed 
globalisation further by forcing the national regulatory and supervisory environment of several 
states to adapt to the international scale. Therefore, if European integration history was closely 
linked to that of capitalism, the fact that capitalism had not borders, but that Europe did, would 
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